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Abstract: Our research reflects on the passing of a justice model linked to moral 
law imputes, positive punishment for non-compliance, for a model that reconciles 
justice. Following this line of thought, we add the contributions of Axel Honneth, 
according to which the establishment of a normative principle of justice must 
provide guidance for political action. This was only made possible to the extent 
that such principles are allied to social practices. By analyzing the Spirit of 
Christianity and its Fate, an early work of Hegel, we intend to verify the 
relevance of the concept of justice, for the design of the hegelian attack on the 
positive law and subsequent defense of ethics as reconciliation and fullness of 
life. From the understanding of justice as reconciliation in Hegel we approach 
that which underlies the reconstruction of social practices as Honneth 
understands. 
Keywords: Justice; Reconciliation; Society; Law; Recognition. 
 
Resumo: O presente texto reflete sobre a aprovação de um modelo de justiça 
vinculado a imputações da lei moral, punição positiva pelo descumprimento, por 
um modelo conciliador de justiça. Seguindo essa linha de pensamento, 
consideramos as contribuições de Axel Honneth, segundo as quais o 
estabelecimento de um princípio normativo de justiça deve fornecer orientação 
para a ação política. Isso só foi possível na medida em que tais princípios são 
aliados às práticas sociais. Ao analisar O Espírito do Cristianismo e seu Destino, 
que foi um dos primeiros trabalhos de Hegel, pretendemos verificar a relevância 
do conceito de justiça para o esboço do ataque hegeliano ao direito positivo e a 
defesa subsequente da ética como reconciliação e plenitude de vida. A partir da 
compreensão da justiça como reconciliação em Hegel, abordamos o que está 
subjacente à reconstrução das práticas sociais, como Honneth entende. 
Palavras-chave: Justiça; Reconciliação; Sociedade; Direito; Reconhecimento. 
 
Introduction 
It is in the social relations permeated by the dialogue that justice 
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will be established in society. Therefore, there is a way of justice linked to 
law that divides, but a justice that, beyond formalism and positivism of 
law that separates promotes reconciliation in love. Justice understood as 
love is based on social practices. For this reason, justice linked to strict 
compliance of the law, attests that Hegel in his Spirit of Christianity and 
its Fate, does not meet the objectives for which it proposes. It is therefore 
a righteousness that remains strange, distant from the people concerned.  
We present in this survey a route through The Spirit of 
Christianity and its Fate by the motions of the dialectic and the vital 
point, so that the notion of legal justice can be superseded in the new 
notion of justice reconciled in love. Such a culture permeated by Christian 
ethos, transgresses the limits of positive religion and a policy that keeps 
the differential Christian ethical.  
A policy based on the reconstruction of the social practices 
derives from the recognition that decreases the distance between theory 
and praxis of justice policy. Christianity is presented in order to overcome 
the particular sphere, converge in public, as well as a Christian political 
ethics. The proposed constitution of a hegelian justice as reconciliation in 
love does not approach justice in Honneth founded in social relations, 
based on the recognition? 
Here is the text that follows, in three parts. The first is an outline 
of the phenomenological notion of justice, evident that The Spirit of 
Christianity and its Fate of Hegel and Honneth have some approximation 
as a meeting of notions of reconciliation and social practice. The second 
presents obstacles to the establishment of justice in the role of positive law 
and the centralized state, and finally the third part reflects on the justice 
founded on the concept of reconciliation in love and how it approaches the 
right to recognition as a result of practices of members. 
 
1. The immediacy of the Christian ethics: the society 
 We begin our reflection of a Christian ethos that in addition to 
phenomenal, has a rationale and a political implication, marked by the 
transition from the private sphere and strange to the public sphere and 
reconciled - the Christian legacy in history.  
The practices of the early Christians who were once private, 
reserved to the catacombs and remote places, escaping the hostile empire, 
were gradually gaining hegemony within civil and political practices when 
rights and duties had been recognized publicly. These same rights and 
duties arose from a positive religion to elevate themselves to a political 
and introduced institutionalization elements contrary to the social contract 
of the state.  
The primacy of the individual to be imposed on the community 
originates positivist legalism that prevents freedom. In this sense, the 
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Christian ethos is stated as an individual initiative, but held in the world of 
social and political relations with these and reconciles a full unity. 
Thus, the focus of Hegel in politics, is to ensure independence and 
freedom by individuals and nations. Therefore, part of Greek mythology, 
is marked by the experience of peoples and plural gods, through Jewish 
monotheism, marked by the worship of the one God and the law that 
segregates the Jewish people as the chosen people.  
For Christianity Jesus' practice, which seeks to overcome the 
barrier of individualism is a return to the element of the Greek polis, 
involved in Christian ethics. Therefore, according to Caterina Deligiorgi, 
it is "[...] an ethic that emphasizes the context, history, community, and 
the roles and relationships that give substance to our moral life.
2
" And 
these are relationships that are being constructed as social practices that 
serve as the basis for the establishment of justice.  
Thus, determining what is right starts from, by Axel Honneth, 
"[...] social practices that inform us about the respect for justice.
3
" It is 
acting in a company that builds the sense of what is just or unjust, not 
simply granting this task to the State. The moral life that exceeds the 
limits of the formalism of positive law. It implies a political community 
that without this policy implication, results in leveling promoted by 
anarchist movements, because the leveling leads to crystalization of vital 
provisions and again to the positivism of the law, both in the Church and 
in the State. 
By this way the positivity is taken only in part, and 
among the Shamans of Tungo with church and state 
ruled by the Mongolian or European prelates with the 
Puritan and the [man] who obeys the command of 
duty. The difference is that those became servants 
and they would be free. This becomes so completely 
outrageous that the content should get the 
commandment of universal duty, a duty given, in 
contradiction to be both limited and universal, and 
that makes the way of universal will for sidedness 
pretension (Hegel, ECD, TWS, 1994, p. 323). 
 
The resulting positive law of moral Christianity must be overcome, as has 
consequences for the social and political life. Having to analyze the fate of 
Judaism, Hegel shows that the Jews have not reached the status of citizens 
by the fact of staying in the position of dependence on their "[...] legislator 
invisible [...] and citizenship, which is the condition of all policy, held that 
reliance"(Hegel, EJ, TWS, 1999, p. 290). However, this same addiction 
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has maintained the Jewish people constant to their strange God, as 
Christianity eventually incurring from the early Christians. Thus, both 
Jusdaísmo like Christianity become positive religions, which also 
occurred in the political sphere with the central state. Therefore, the only 
religion that presents an ethics that exceeds positive legalism is that which 
Jesus founded. 
 Jesus appears as an immediacy. His presence, however 
indeterminate and original, is decisive for the establishment of an ethical 
model with substantial policy implications. His life and work, for the 
more original and immediate that show in its infancy,is a fact, a universal 
to assume the high points of life - Lebenshöhepunke. Such vital 
culmination is reached through his practice inuagurated from his way of 
being unique, candid and free. For this undeniable reason, the effects of 
the practice of Jesus, with their simple appearance, pure and original 
influences on policy. 
 The attack of Jesus on the political life of a particular people, 
accustomed to an established order, as a formula and a doctrine meant that 
the last vestige of political existence was shaken from its foundations. 
With this shock, we are witnessing the birth of a new modality in ethical 
life: no more accustomed to hierarchy and the law, but the singular 
existence that is experienced in the world of social relations and practices. 
However, to ensure autonomy there should be "(...) normative foundations 
that require a legal guarantee.
4
" The principles thus developed based on 
justice are guidelines for political action. However, what we see is that the 
principles are built in such a way that they become impossible to derive 
from their political action.  
Being bound by a positive law, for this reason being the move 
towards the destruction of the positivism of law, it acquires the flexibility 
to serve as a basis for political action and engagement. This difficulty we 
attribute not only to the distance between theory and praxis as Honneth 
understands
5
, but especially by the positivism of the principles of justice. 
This same positivism that Hegel has found in the laws governing both 
Judaism and Christianity of Jesu’s followers.  
As recalls Otto Pöggeler, to oppose the world the Christian 
religion is also apolitical, it cannot do what is best for Hegel - to be the 
soul of a people composed of free men
6
. In other words, there is a 
separation between the political and social: "The politician can only be 
adequately separated from the social with the advent of revolutionary or 
centralized monarchical states, which were clearly distinct from the social 
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life of their subjects.
7
" Jesus acted as a true revoluncionary
8
 to the extent 
that this was a break with the established order up until then. As much as 
this shows through resentment on the part of Jesus, it ultimately reveals 
the insertion of politics into religion, to the extent that the policy itself as 
Christian practice is unique. 
For this reason, both Hegel and Nietzsche recognize the spirit of 
Christianity as a singularity, real and effective, which may be corrupted by 
historic structure to become positive, so that God becomes strange and 
moralizing. That same problem Jesus once criticized in Judaism. What are 
the consequences of positivism of faith to historic Christianity and justice 
that can be seen? 
 
2. From the legal externality to the moral commandment: the 
institutions 
Hegel attacks that law which remains external, disconnected from 
reality, without reference to the human. "Jesus reacted against that law, 
that we call laws for different considerations, whether moral or civil. At 
this point, they express natural relations of men in the form of 
commandment" (Hegel, ECD, TWS, 1994, p. 321).  
However, the law is required in regard to normalization of life in 
human society. Through it, human relationships are nuanced, skittled and 
sorted according to a live that is minimally consensual. Here it is that one 
gets a philosophical theory of justice that goes and serves and serve as a 
basis for political action. That human, raw and immediate, cannot remain 
closed in itself, but should, leaving you, come into confrontation with the 
external, (i.e. social relations skittled).  
So, apart from himself, the human denies that which, until then, 
was judged to be correct, just and true. He denies certain prejudices that 
will give room for a reflective distance. In this sense, the law plays an 
important role in helping humans to live in relationships. It call us, 
therefore, to question the nature of moral commands and their 
compatibility with the finite human agents.  
The rational moral law finds expression in many types of human 
practices, namely the relationship between morality and reason, freedom 
and nature, metaphysics and history, which has, in the figure of Jesus, one 
emblematic example. Jesus is the one who does not revoke any point of 
law, but gives it its sense of fullness to reconcile it with the human agents 
as people aware of their collective nature and at the same time, individual 
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and subjective, 
[...] a people is a concrete embodiment, a realization 
of the individual spirit, is both a totality and 
individuality. The impossibility of love - living bond 
and supra-individual - to extend indefinitely, was felt 
profoundly by Christ, whose freedom to keep and 
maintain the absolute integrity of its purity, turned 
out to be a freedom in the void.
9
 
 
From the point of view of political centralization the danger is that the 
weight standards, represented by state action, cannot proclude that other 
dimensions of life, beyond the state, are achieved for justice: "The danger 
of such state centralization, is clearly in the fact that everything is out of 
reach of the legal power that constitute the state surprisingl be 
unattainable by the demands of justice.
10
 "On the contrary justice should 
extend its field of action in all spheres of society so that the normative 
dimension that it demands be realized to redraw the diversity of people. 
So that the law should update a particular people, should be open 
to provide an organic totality in his meeting and update the different 
peoples and cultures. It is in the relationships among people that in the law 
as a fixed asset translates into a mutually shared well. "None of these 
prerequisites has the form of a fixed asset, they can not simply be 'owned' 
as 'things', but must be laboriously acquired in and through relationships 
between people.
11
" 
This same confusion in the relationship between people and things 
is part of reality that can be seen from the Church and Christian ethos. 
Peter Hodgson says that in the fate of Jesus and the Church, there is an 
unresolved contradiction between the truths of the gospel and the demands 
of the external world. For this reason "[...] spiritual freedom imagined by 
the gospel cannot be updated in the ethical and political reality
12
" because 
the impermeability of the law that is clear from the transmission of the 
Christian legacy prevents it from being absorbed in different cultures, 
which results in employing it as strange or is simply denied. The fate of 
the Christian spirit ends up falling in that same issue of Jewish 
estrangement from God in the law, for their inflexibility prevents the 
encounter with the differences represented by nature, by the other gods 
and nations. 
The fate of Christianity becomes an institutionalized religion, not 
in that original spirit of its founder, but in that of his successors. It is a 
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Christianity founded on a set of empty moral laws which, in its modern 
expression, puts the individual under the weight of divine command 
morality. The path, for Hegel, is to overcome this individualism, 
expression of moralism, which is in living in society.  
As an expression of an ethic of mutual respect, society brings 
elements of contractualism and naturalism: a subject of rights and duties 
as a reconciled unity in ethics as Butler writes, "Hegel designates this 
ideal of harmony ethics Sittlichkeit by the German term, which he 
contrasts with 'morality' based on private conscience. The ethical 
individual who participates in the life of the polis is guided by 
institutionalized rules in practice"
13
. 
Beyond morality linked to the imperatives of individual life, 
ethics concerns the life of the community, social customs
14
 and lived 
practices. The ethical life is a problem deduced "a priori" the notion of 
freedom, thus a problem inherited by Kant, which represents, again, the 
synthesis of freedom and nature, between virtue and autonomy, so that 
they exceed the dimensions of individual morality to take the policy in its 
practical and instituicional dimension as recalls Douglas Moggach "[...] 
the concept of autonomy has to be related not only to morality itself, but 
the political institutions and practices [...] from [...] the distortions of the 
effects of private interest.
15
". 
In ethics the different events are recognized by the agents as 
actions that contribute to the understanding of their freedom. Therefore, it 
is necessary that the principles of justice be an expression of the common 
will of all social agents in order to ensure "[...] each other the same 
freedoms of subjective action." These freedoms are the unique ethos, 
which necessarily involves social life: the place of confrontation between 
subject and object. 
Then, with the removal of this sovereign and distant vision of 
God, Christianity begins to settle down, as a religion of the heart, so that 
the law can be seen if it deepens singular ethos as a practice in which 
justice can be done, a '[...] consciousness, a sense of ardent life and 
destiny,' love the fact '"
 16
. This dismissal is involved in overcoming a type 
of Christianity based on the authority of the moral law. The institution, 
looking beyond the law and morality that surpasses the bad conscience is 
the promotion of justice? As justice, as uniqueness of life open and full in 
the reconciliation of love and culmination of life: Lebenshöhepunke has its 
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strongest expression in the law? 
 
3. From the reflexivity of ethos to the fullness of love: the Law
17
 
 The ethos as the one most immediate reality that, having passed 
through the denial of self is reconciled as love, is constituted as self-
reflective unity, therefore, far from determinism it is open to fully closed, 
as becoming. Thus, it is no longer a reality crude and immediate, nor a 
moral and positive externality, but a reconciled reflexivity as a whole, the 
"[...] love, which becomes aware before the altar of a quarrel, [...] leaves 
no measure by the judge, but reconciles himself without any regard to the 
law "(Hegel, ECD, TWS, 1994, p. 328).  
The institution which culminates in the law
18
 is one that is not 
attached to the positive aspect of it, but excels in ethos, in a single 
practice. Through this overshoot one finds apparent freedom
19
 which 
demands differences, fundamental to the opening of creating life that 
deepens to its most climactic. In the social and political institution, the 
force that reconciles the culmination of the differences is in the form of 
law. Thus, the Legal reconciliation does not act as an equal mass, but as a 
unit that excels and saves the differences in an organic whole. So that the 
parties involved in the social recognize each other in their differences and 
thus build the freedom and autonomy: "[...] to learn, through recognition 
by other people who understand us as beings whose needs, beliefs and 
skills are worthy of being carried.
20
". For it is only mutual recognition 
between subjects that autonomy is built. Therefore secured the recognition 
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of differences of which the law demands. 
 Law it implies unequal social relations that excel in eagerness to 
establish unity in singular differences which assures the privilege of every 
single individual. The law results in a privilege which states the unique 
ethos beyond the law, as in the minds of Cristianity. Jesus announces, 
through their practice, the existence of laws to be accompanied by justice, 
it rises beyond the positivism of law, reconciliation between "[...] slope 
with the law by which this law loses its shape; this agreement of slope is 
the πληρπμα of law, a being who, as can be expressed in another way, is 
an additional possibility, because possibility is the objective as one 
thought, one universal "(Hegel, ECD, TWS, 1994, p. 326).  
Through reconciliation in love, Jesus leaves the fate of Jewish 
"[...] live eternally separated from God and men, because, by reflection, 
designed his ideal beyond themselves and because in the separated life 
[...] Jesus came to reconcile his people with life, with love.
21
" Therefore 
Jesus takes his own destiny: the fate of destinations, love, which is life in 
its fullness. In practice, Jesus makes morality and obedience to a law 
opening to infinite life in love, through a singular ethic expressed as law 
that safeguards the joyful acceptance of fate.  
The right is required to be established "[...] the creation of just 
social relations [...] enable all subjects also a form of self-determination 
that allows them to be as independent of their interaction partners as 
possible.
22
" The involvement of all subjects in the social relations of 
which require a political action unit reveals just what love is. Social 
practices are lived in unity and wholeness.  
These social practices that result in love are the synthesis of 
subject and object and the resulting loss of their opposition to 
reconciliation between the two, which applies reconciliation between law 
and inclinations. In practice, Jesus reconciles the separate parts by the 
estrangement of law in love, which is the spirit of reconciliation: 
[...] being [is] the synthesis of subject and object, in 
which subject and object have lost their position, 
even as each trend, a virtue, is a synthesis in which 
the law (to which Kant always appoints a goal) loses 
its universality and likewise the subject loses its 
particularity; - both lost objection, since in this 
opposition remains Kantian virtue one becomes 
dominant and dominated the other (Hegel, ECD, 
TWS, 1994, p. 326). 
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The spirit of reconciliation, as preached by Jesus, ensures the differences 
stored in all plurality, in which nothing escapes their joyous welcome. 
This is expressed, according to Herman Siemens, not in one "[...] contract 
quiet, but in a violent conflict and domination
23
" in an organic nature 
beyond a moral ideology that often lurks behind democratic values in 
function of establishing universal rights. But I would say yes: in function 
to establish a law that hoards the plurality of organic provisions in all 
plurality, as the practice of Jesus was guided to open to the plurality of 
peoples and nations. Given this notion of law as organic totality open to 
reconcile the plurality in a fullness, the opponent is no longer a stranger to 
become someone who recognizes the other in their differences, but an 
individuality that maintains differences, as noted by William Connolly, a 
"[...] pluralism and an ethos of engagement that puts graceful preliminary 
conditions of possibility for each other.
24
" 
 In the practice of life that establishes social relations of 
recognition elevates the law to its fullest, the sense of unity that makes 
humans commit all their forces to reach the fullness of life, its ethos: that 
is the culmination of force. The most genuine spirit of Christianity can be 
seen in a practice of life that declares reconciliation and unity, which 
demands social and politicals justice, and its expression in law. In this 
sense, the culmination of this strength is in the love that is recognition of 
the other in their differences and not in the possession of wealth. 
Otherwise, the view of wealth as an end in itself, opposed to love, 
accentuates objective externality and therefore divides.  
This is one of the destinations in which Christianity has incurred; 
"Property is a destination, a death, objectively speaking, that resists the 
fulfillment of love.
25
" Thus, while the moral law and property tend to 
separate, Christian ethics tends to unite the love so as to enable social 
justice policies. And these are established in that which is mediated by 
decreasing the distances between theories of justice and political praxis, it 
promotes corporate social where those involved are recognized for their 
qualities and to be granted that normative gear formerly reserved only to 
the exercise of the centralizing state. 
 
Conclusion 
The individual is reconciled with the law in that he does not find 
it, as a reality hostile to him, but to be one with him, who is the fullness of 
life. There is no way to destroy something that does not destroy it 
completely, so the relationship established between crime and punishment 
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is a strange relationship, by the imputation of a formal duty that awakens a 
sense of passive resignation and impotence. The law, in the form of law 
that reconciles the particular to the universal, is able to restore the 
integrity and fullness of life. For all the action that comes from life, there 
is a whole with it, and even crime comes as a whole. 
The apparent universality whereby it presents the instance of 
positive law, or that just creeps in front of the special individual in law has 
a bond of reconciliation, a reconciliation that, far from abandoning oneself 
to a positive and formalist universalism and individualism, opens to a 
singularity vitalist ethic. It is in the practice of Jesus that we have a 
concrete way: that practice of the true Christian who is presented as an 
indeterminate immediacy, so free, it is not only possible, but is necessary 
to live. This practice, to rise beyond legalism empty and strange, 
corresponds to fidelity to life, so the ultimate freedom to give up 
everything to save, promotes social relations from established action that 
allow just policy. Through this practice it becomes feasible to resume the 
reconciliation of friendship and love as universal law and order, at a level 
that does not require otheres to have their rights violated. That is the level 
of law that overcame the conflict between morality and law, "[...] in 
Hegel's conception, morality and law cannot, ultimately, conflict: a moral 
critique of current social and legal provisions seldom, or never, is 
appropriate or reasonably sustainable.
26” 
Morality and Law reconciled, involve the field of life; hostility 
turns into friendship and fate dissipates. Otherwise personal hatred born of 
a lack caused to an individual develops the rigorous observance of duty as 
a violation of the moral commandments. Those that feed this hatred staff 
refuse to give and receive forgiveness and to be reconciled to a destiny. 
However, those who tolerate in others and in themselves, despite the laws, 
everything that is and has, establishes union for love as obedience to the 
law, not as mere resignation to it, but with the inclusion of her life, an 
entire whole. Social relations, the recognition of differences, builds 
autonomy: "[...] it is composed of living relations of reciprocal 
recognition.
27
" Life in its fullness reconciled enhances political actions 
grounded in righteousness: [...] where we recognize each other as free and 
equal citizens and thereby attain the consciousness of our political 
autonomy.
28
" The political autonomy that Honneth proposes approaches 
that of proposed Christian ethics, with regard to that sphere which does 
not act as a strange force, as a punishment that presents itself as something 
to judge allocate some misconduct, but a destination that assumes the 
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fullness of life, which demand fair shares. 
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